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Should workers be informed of the incentive schemes governing their team co-
workers? Should workers be told on which performance measure they will be as-
sessed? Should workers be told how important the tasks are for the organization?
This paper shows in an abstract moral hazard setup why in rich enough environ-
ments it is always strictly desirable that some aspects of the interaction be kept
unknown to the workers. Thus, full transparency is argued to be suboptimal quite
generally.
1 Introduction
A central question of organizational design is about how to make workers exert more
productive e⁄ort. Classic economic analysis requires using instruments such as wages
and bonuses indexed on what is observable to the principal so as to best align workers￿
interest with the organizational objective (see Holmstr￿m (1979-1982) or Myerson (1982)
for classic references). In this paper, I ask myself whether it can be bene￿cial for the
organization that the workers be incompletely informed of the details of the interaction
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1they are in. It should be noted that I do not necessarily insist that instruments such as
wages and bonuses be optimally adjusted,1 but I take the view that how information is
distributed in the organization can (at least partly) be controlled by the organization.
From another perspective, I am interested in whether it is a good idea for organiza-
tions to be as transparent as possible by which I mean to let workers know everything the
organization knows including the performance measures that are available in the organiz-
ation, the compensation schemes applying to co-team workers, how important the tasks
are for the organization etc.
I use an abstract setup to address this question. Agents can potentially interact over
a family of moral hazard problems which are parameterized by a state variable ￿ that
takes its value in an s-dimensional space. In each moral hazard problem ￿, agent i has to
choose an unobservable action ai in an ni-dimensional space. In some interactions there
may be only one agent, in others there may be several agents. Monetary instruments
may potentially be used in which case they must be indexed on what is observed by the
principal and veri￿able by third parties.
Such an abstract framework is extremely general allowing me to speak of moral hazard
in team interactions (Holmstr￿m, 1982), multi-tasking (Holmstr￿m and Milgrom, 1991;
see also Baker, 2000), delegation and authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997), Sender-receiver
interactions (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) to name just a few (classic) applications.
I address the transparency question by comparing the organizational payo⁄ when
agents have full information about ￿ and when (at least) one agent has incomplete in-
formation about ￿ where I allow myself to choose the information structure of the agents
freely. When there exists a coarse information structure that allows the organization to
strictly enhance its objective, I say that non-transparency is desirable.
The main result of this paper is that when the space of moral hazard problems is rich
enough (i.e., ￿ has dimension strictly larger than the dimensionality of at least one agent￿ s
action space), non-transparency is desirable. More generally, assuming that only partial
aspects of ￿ can be kept secret to agents, the non-transparency result generically holds,
as soon as the dimension of ￿ that can be hidden exceeds the dimension of the action
space of agents. Importantly, the conclusion need not be the same if the dimensionality
1There may be other constraints limiting the scope for optimal adjustments.
2of the space of moral hazard problems is the same as or lower than the dimensionality of
agents￿action spaces, as I demonstrate through examples.
In my view, such a result is signi￿cant because in most cases the space of moral
hazard problems would typically vary over more dimensions than there are dimensions in
agents￿action spaces. This is because parameters of the moral hazard problem include
(among other things) how important the tasks are to the organization and how costly
it is to change the action in each dimension of the action space of each agent (and the
organization can a priori hide to a worker the cost structure of co-workers as well the
magnitude of the stakes for the organization).2 Thus, the conclusion established in this
paper about the desirability of non-transparency should be expected to apply to quite
generally.
The basic trade-o⁄ concerning the e⁄ect of coarsening an agent￿ s information about
￿ is as follows. If an agent receives incomplete information about ￿, it makes it easier
to satisfy the incentive constraints (i.e., to make the agent choose what he is supposed
to choose) as compared with the complete information case. This is because incomplete
information allows the principal to aggregate the various incentive constraints into a single
one, simpler to satisfy. But, incomplete information also forces the agent not to be able
to adjust his action to the problem ￿, which may sometimes be undesirable. In general,
the comparison between the complete and incomplete information case can go either way.
But, when the state variable ￿ varies over more dimensions than there are dimensions
in the action space of one of the agents, one can always ￿nd an information structure of
this agent such that the positive e⁄ect dominates the negative one, thereby showing that
some form of non-transparency is always optimal.
To suggest the importance of the dimensionality requirement for the result, consider
a family of moral hazard in team interactions which would vary only according to the
degree of complementarity between the team members￿e⁄orts. Hiding the degree of
complementarity to workers would not in general be a good idea because it would average
the e⁄ort level across the various team interactions whereas it would typically be preferable
to induce more e⁄ort when the degree of complementarity is higher and less e⁄ort when it
is lower. However, if the team interactions di⁄er also in how important the tasks are for the
2Alternatively, the organization can ensure that the bonus schemes of agents (that typically depend
on the realization of the various dimensions of e⁄ort) is not publicly available.
3organization, not letting the workers know whether the interaction is of little importance
for the organization but with high degree of complementarity or of great importance to the
organization but with low degree of complementarity may be desirable because it allows
the organization to take advantage of the easing of the incentive constraints brought by
the high degree of complementarity in the less important interaction for the task that is
more important for the organization.
From a more theoretical perspective, when the state variable ￿ varies over more dimen-
sions than there are dimensions in the action space of one of the agents, simple topological
arguments reveal that there must be a manifold of positive dimension in the space of ￿
in which were the agent to be fully informed of ￿ he would play in the same way over
the various ￿ in the manifold. Clearly, if the agent were only informed that ￿ lies in the
manifold rather than being informed of the exact realization of ￿, this would make no
di⁄erence. The idea behind the transparency result is to bundle ￿1 and ￿2 in an inform-
ation set where ￿1 lies in the manifold and ￿2 lies in the neighborhood of the manifold
(away from ￿1, which is possible because the manifold has a strictly positive dimension).
For generic objective functions, the main result of this paper shows that one can always
￿nd such an information structure with the e⁄ect of strictly enhancing the organizational
objective as compared with the complete information case.
Related literature:
1) In a framework allowing for both private information and private actions unobserv-
able to the principal, Myerson (1982) considers the optimal mechanism and shows that
the principal can restrict herself to incentive-compatible direct coordination mechanisms
in which agents report their information to the principal who then recommends to them
decisions forming a correlated equilibrium.3 In the context of the present analysis, this
implies that if a mediator could be used to make recommendations to agents in the various
￿, the optimal mechanism (￿ la Myerson) could be implemented with agent(s) being only
informed of which action to play and not which ￿ prevails.
The non-transparency result of this paper is of a di⁄erent nature. First, it applies even
outside the context of optimal mechanisms (including situations in which no mediator can
3Such an observation can be viewed as an expression of the revelation principle in such settings. See
Rahman (2010) for an interesting recent application of Myerson￿ s insight.
4be used or monetary instruments are limited or even inexistent). Second, Myerson￿ s obser-
vation does not imply that providing information about ￿ would be strictly detrimental
to the principal, which should be contrasted with our main ￿nding that some form of
incomplete information is strictly desirable relative to the complete information case.
2) The question addressed in this paper is related to the optimal information disclos-
ure question addressed in Rayo and Segal (2010) and to the Bayesian persuasion question
addressed in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). These authors consider Sender-Receiver
interactions in which the Sender possesses private information and the Receiver chooses
an action based on the information he has (or infers from the Sender￿ s communication).
And they ask themselves which disclosure policy the Sender should commit to so as to
maximize her expected payo⁄. Restricting attention to Principal-agent interactions with
no monetary transfers, my non-transparency result says that a Sender whose private in-
formation has higher dimension than the dimension of the action of the Receiver can
do better than disclosing everything he knows. It turns out that an illustration of the
non-transparency result can be found in the context studied by Rayo and Segal in which
the Sender possesses information both on how valuable to the Sender and the Receiver
the project is, and the Receiver chooses a probability of choosing the project (a one-
dimensional action). Rayo and Segal￿setup satis￿es the dimensionality property required
for the non-transparency result, and indeed Rayo and Segal observe that the best dis-
closure policy is never to disclose everything to the Receiver.4 I note that Kamenica and
Gentzkow￿ s investigation of Bayesian persuasion focuses on when it is best for the Sender
to disclose some information (as opposed to none) to the Sender, which is at the other
extreme of the non-transparency question asking when it is best not to disclose as much
as possible.
3) From a more general perspective, the idea that hiding some information might
help achieving better outcomes has been considered in a number of settings (Abreu-
Milgrom-Pearce (1991), Lizzeri-Meyer-Persico (2002) or Aoyagi (2010) to name just a
4Rayo and Segal characterize fully the optimal disclosure policy in their more structured steup. By
contrast, this paper shows how general the non-transparency result is when the dimensionality property
holds without characterizing the optimal disclosure policy.
As Rayo and Segal note, almost no paper in the Sender-Receiver tradition has considered the case in
which the Sender possesses a multi-dimensional private information. Rayo and Segal together with this
paper (if particularized to the Sender-Receiver case) are the exceptions.
5few). The logic of the results reported in these papers is related to the basic observation
that coarsening the information of agents helps alleviating their incentive constraints.
What the main Theorem of this paper shows is that the strict desirability of having
incomplete information applies quite generally, whenever the state space is of a su¢ ciently
large dimensionality. None of the above mentioned papers has highlighted the role of
dimensionality.5
4) The desirability of transparency addressed in this paper is also related to the theme
of the value of information in strategic interactions (see Hirshleifer (1971) and Bassan
et al (2003) for, respectively, a pioneering and more recent contribution on the subject).
From a more applied perspective, Milgrom and Weber (1982) show in the context of
auctions with a¢ liated signals that providing more information to bidders increases rev-
enues (an insight known as the linkage principle which should be contrasted with our
non-transparency result, see also Ottaviani and Prat (2001) for a similar investigation for
a price discriminating monopolist).
5) Finally, it should be mentioned that there have been many other approaches to
transparency in organizations. I mention here just a few to help locating the present con-
tribution in the literature. In seminal contributions, Holmstr￿m (1979-1982) has shown
in static moral hazard problems that it is always best that the principal be as informed
as possible, as it allows her to better monitor the agent(s). In subsequent works, (CrØmer
(1995), Dewatripont et al. (1999) or Prat (2005) to name just a few), dynamic consid-
erations have been introduced, imposing some limited commitment capabilities on the
Principal￿ s side. There, less information for the Principal may help the Principal, as it
may alleviate her commitment problems. Note that this line of research is more concerned
with changing the information held by the Principal whereas the focus of this paper is on
the information held by the agents (as well as the feedback transmitted to them).6
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Preliminary examples are provided in
5While Battaglini (2006) emphasizes the role of dimensionality in a multi-agent moral hazard problem,
the question addressed in his paper is of a di⁄erent nature (i.e., it is about how the dimensionality of the
signal space helps distinguishing deviators from non-deviators).
6Other approaches to transparency in which the information of third party is considered includes
Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009) and Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010) among others. Winter (2010) considers
a di⁄erent form of transparency, i.e. whether it is good or bad for the organization to let agents observe
their peer￿ s e⁄ort choices, and he asks himself which observability structure allows the organization to
best rule out undesirable outcomes in a team problem.
6Section 2. A general framework is presented in Section 3. Our two main questions are
formally stated in Section 4. Section 5 contains the main results as well as a discussion
of these. Section 6 illustrates the key role played by the dimensionality in deriving the
main insights. Concluding remarks appear in Section 7.
2 Preliminary examples
In this Section I provide simple examples illustrating that some form of non-transparency
may sometimes be good for the organization. In the rest of the paper, I will develop an
abstract setup in which the questions will be addressed with much greater generality.
2.1 A Principal-Agent example
Consider two one-agent moral hazard problems ￿x; ￿y in which the agent must perform
two tasks ax;ay 2 [0;1]. The cost incurred by the agent takes the additive form c(ax;ay) =
h(ax) + h(ay) both in ￿x and ￿y where h(0) = h0(0) = 0 and h(￿) is assumed to be
increasing:
The output exhibits complementarities between the two tasks. Speci￿cally, output is
given by z = axay + " where " is the realization of some normal distribution centered
around 0.
Output is not assumed to be observable (at least within a reasonable amount of time).
In situation ￿x, only qx = ax + "x is observed by the principal (and veri￿able by third
parties) and similarly in situation ￿y, only qy = ay +"y is observed by the principal where
"x and "y are the realizations of independent normal distributions centered around 0.
Situations ￿x and ￿y are assumed to be equally likely in the organization.
I assume that wages must be non-negative. The principal￿ s instrument thus boils
down to o⁄ering bonus schemes wx(qx) ￿ 0 in ￿x or wy(qy) ￿ 0 in ￿y. The agent and the
principal are assumed to be risk neutral. The agent gets a payo⁄ equal to w ￿ c(ax;ay)
when he earns w and exerts e⁄ort a = (ax;ay); the principal gets an expected payo⁄equal
to axay ￿ w under the same circumstances.
It is rather easy to see the advantage of not letting the agent know whether ￿x or ￿y.
To see this, assume ￿rst that the agent knows ￿x. Then clearly, the agent will pick ay = 0
7whatever wx(￿) (this is because ay does not a⁄ect qx and any ay > 0 would induce strictly
positive extra cost). Thus, expected output is 0 in the full information case (and wx(￿)
and wy(￿) are optimally set at 0).
By contrast, consider the case in which the agent does not know whether ￿x or ￿y at
the time he must choose ax, ay.7 It is fairly easy to induce ax > 0 and ay > 0 through




E(wx(ax + "x)) +
1
2
E(wy(ay + "y)) ￿ c(ax;ay):
More precisely, one can establish that the full information benchmark is dominated by
the coarse information case whenever h00(0) < 1
2 (by considering schemes of the form
wz(qz) = max(0;!qz) for su¢ ciently small ! and z = x;y).
In more intuitive terms, not letting the agent know whether ￿x or ￿y makes it easier to
let the agent exert e⁄ort on both tasks because he does not know which one will be used
as a performance measure to reward him. By contrast, when the agent knows that he will
be assessed only on the basis of ax (which is a consequence of the monitoring technology
in ￿x) he has no incentive to exert e⁄ort on ay, which when the two tasks are su¢ ciently
complement, is very detrimental to the output.8 A related intuition appears in a recent
paper by Ederer et al. (2008) who consider mixed moral hazard Principal-agent problems
in which the agent has superior information.
Of course, the above example should not be interpreted to mean that coarse inform-
ation is always good. An obvious potential disadvantage of coarse information is that
the agent can no longer adjust his e⁄ort decision to the exact conditions governing the
moral hazard interaction. In general, coarse information has the advantage of easing the
incentive constraints (because it aggregates several incentive constraints into a single one,
thus easier to satisfy), and it has the disadvantage of making the strategy less sensitive to
the environment (the strategy must be measurable with respect to a coarser information
7After ax and ay are chosen, the agent is informed whether ￿ = ￿x or ￿y so that the bonus scheme
can be implemented.
8One might alternatively assume that there are two self-interested agents, one in charge of choosing ax
(with cost c(ax)) and one in charge of choosing ay (with cost c(ax)) and not having agents know whether
￿ = ￿x or ￿y is preferable when the two tasks are su¢ ciently complement.
8partition). The trade-o⁄ between these two forces can go either way in general. But, as
will be seen later on, when the space of problems is rich enough, one can always ￿nd a
coarse information structure that strictly enhances the designer￿ s objective as compared
with the full information benchmark.
2.2 A moral hazard in team example
Consider the following two moral hazard in team interactions denoted X and Y , which
are equally likely. In each interaction, two agents i = 1, 2 must simultaneously exert an
e⁄ort ai 2 R+. The outcome of the team interaction is either successful with probability
p(a1;a2;￿) or it is not successful with probability 1 ￿ p(a1;a2;￿) where
p(a1;a2;￿) = a1 + a2 + ￿a1a2:
The parameter ￿ > 0 re￿ ects the complementarity between agents￿e⁄orts. The reward
to the organization in case of success depends on the interaction. It is RX in interaction
X and RY in interaction Y . The bonus received by the agents in case of success is set
independently of the interaction. To simplify the exposition, this bonus is null for agent
2 and it is w for agent 1. Agent 2 thus exerts e⁄ort up to the point the e⁄ort becomes
costly. The e⁄ort cost to agent 2 is assumed to depend on the interaction so that agent
2 exerts no e⁄ort in interaction Y and e⁄ort a > 0 in interaction X. The e⁄ort cost to
agent 1 is 1
2(a1)2 in both X and Y .
Our question of interest is whether agent 1 should be informed whether the interaction
is X or Y . Agent 2 exerts more e⁄ort in X than in Y , and there is complementarity in
e⁄ort in both X and Y . So if Y is su¢ ciently more important than Y to the organization
(RY > RX), not letting agent 1 know whether the interaction is X or Y may be bene￿cial
as it may allow to boost agent 1￿ s incentive scheme in the more important task Y thanks
to the higher e⁄ort level of agent 2 in task X:
Formally, if agent 1 knows he is in X, he exerts e⁄ort a1 so as to maximize (a1 + a +
￿a1a)w ￿ 1
2(a1)2. That is, aX
1 = (1 + ￿a)w.
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[(RY ￿ w) ￿ (1 + ￿a)(RX ￿ w)]
which is positive if RY is su¢ ciently larger than RX.
3 A general framework
Throughout the paper, moral hazard problems with one or two agents parameterized by
￿ 2 Rs are considered. The parameter ￿ is assumed to be distributed according to a
smooth (i.e., continuously di⁄erentiable) density p(￿) that is strictly positive on some
open subset of Rs. Extensions to more than two agents raise no di¢ culties. In every
moral hazard problem ￿, agent i = 1, 2 chooses an action ai in Ai, an open subset of Rni.
Agents choose their actions simultaneously, that is, without observing the actions chosen
by the other agent.9
While the designer is assumed to know ￿, I consider various informational assumptions
regarding what the agents know about ￿. In addition, the designer may or may not
(depending on the application) be allowed to use instruments w = (w1;w2) 2 R!1 ￿ R!2
that a⁄ect agents 1 and 2￿incentives respectively, and that are based on what can be
observed by the designer and third parties (typically actions ai are not observable by the
designer or they are not veri￿able by third parties to make the problem non-trivial).
In problem ￿, agent i￿ s expected payo⁄ is ui(a1;a2;w;￿). The designer￿ s expected
payo⁄ is ￿(a1;a2;w;￿). The relevant range of ai, w, ￿ will assumed to be bounded
9Extensions to the case of sequential play would raise no di¢ culty.
10throughout the paper.
It should be mentioned that in the above formulation, agents￿participation constraints
are not explicitly taken into account. Yet, when one of the actions in Ai ensures that
agent i gets at least what he can get outside the interaction (whatever aj), then agent
i￿ s participation constraint is automatically satis￿ed. Participation constraints will be
further discussed later on after our main result is stated. Mechanisms allowing the use of
mediators (￿ la Myerson (1982)) will also be discussed then.
The framework covers lots of classic moral hazard problems. To mention, just a few:
Multi-task and moral hazard (Holmstr￿m and Milgrom, 1991)
Even though the general framework admits several agents, it may obviously be partic-
ularized to one agent moral hazard problems (simply by freezing one of the two agents).
Given that no restrictions are being made on the dimensionality of the action space of the
agent, the framework covers the important application of multi-tasking (such as considered
in subsection 2.1). For example, a single agent may consider exerting e⁄ort ax;ay in two
tasks x and y with a corresponding cost g(ax;ay). The expected output z = h(ax;ay)
is a function of the e⁄ort produced in the two dimensions, and the designer only ob-
serves some signal q = r(ax;ay) + " where " is the realization of a normal distribution
with variance ￿2 and mean 0. The designer may use a signal-dependent wage schedule
w(q) as instrument. The objective of the designer assumed to be risk neutral writes
z ￿ E(w(q)) and the agent assumed to exhibit constant absolute risk aversion gets an
expected utility: ￿E exp[￿￿(w(q) ￿ g(ax;ay)]. The multi-task problem is parameterized
by ￿ = (h;r;￿;￿;g).10
Moral hazard in teams (￿ la Holmstr￿m, 1982)
Consider a class of problems such as the one introduced in Subsection 2.2. Two risk-
neutral agents 1 and 2 in a team simultaneously exert e⁄ort a1 and a2 say within the range
[a;a]. With probability e p(a1;a2;￿) = a1+a2+￿a1a2 the team is successful giving reward R
10In order to ensure that ￿ lives in a space of ￿nite dimension as assumed above, one could further
parameterize the cost function g(￿) and the function r(￿) so that they depend on a ￿nite number of
parameters.




re￿ ects the degree of complementarity
between the e⁄ort levels chosen by the two agents.11
E⁄orts are not directly observable, only success is. Agents must receive non-negative
wages in all events. The instruments available to the designer are the bonuses w1 and
w2 given to agents 1 and 2 respectively in case of success (the wage in case of failure is
optimally set at 0). Letting gi(ai) denote the cost to agent i of making e⁄ort ai, this
moral hazard in team problem falls in the general framework just de￿ned with:
ui(a1;a2;w;￿) = e p(a1;a2;￿)wi ￿ gi(ai)
￿(a1;a2;w;￿) = e p(a1;a2;￿)(R ￿ w1 ￿ w2)
Here, the team problem is parameterized by ￿ = (￿;R;g1;g2), the pro￿le of complement-
arity, reward and cost parameters.
Models of authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997)
Agent 1 exerts e⁄ort a1 to ￿nd out which project to adopt. The principal, agent 2, can
exert e⁄ort so as to improve upon the choice of the agent. A good project for the agent
gives him a private bene￿t b and a good project for the principal gives her a private bene￿t
B. The probability that a good project for the agent (agent 1) is also a good project for
the principal (agent 2) is ￿ and the probability that a good project for the principal is a
good project for the agent is ￿. Identifying the e⁄ort levels with the probability of ￿nding
a good project and letting g1(a1) and g2(a2) denote the costs of e⁄orts made by the agent
and the principal, respectively, the expected utilities of the agent and the principal write:
u1(a1;a2;￿) = a2￿b + (1 ￿ a2)a1b ￿ g1(a1)
u2(a1;a2;￿) = a2B + (1 ￿ a2)a1￿b ￿ g2(a2)
Here the designer￿ s objective coincides with 2￿ s objective ￿(a1;a2;￿) = u2(a1;a2;￿),
and the authority problem is parameterized by ￿ = (￿;￿;b;B;g1;g2), the pro￿le of con-
gruence, private bene￿t and cost parameters.12
11We should assume that 2a + ￿a < 1 so that p(a1;a2;￿) 2 (0;1) for all a1;a2 in [a;a].
12In Aghion-Tirole￿ s model, there are no monetary instruments.
12Sender-Receiver interaction (Crawford-Sobel 1982)
In such setups, the Sender is informed of the state of the economy ! and the Receiver
must choose an action a. The utility of the Receiver and the Sender depend on the state
! and the action: uR(a;!) and uS(a;!). Such a setting obviously falls in the general class
of problems studied in this paper by identifying ! with ￿.
4 Transparency
Within the framework described in Section 3, I ask the following question.
Question. Can it be bene￿cial for the designer that at least one agent, say agent 1,
be partially rather than fully informed of ￿?
When the answer to the above question is a¢ rmative, I say that some form of non-
transparency is desirable.
The above transparency question echoes familiar investigations in economic theory.
For example, it is similar to a question addressed by Milgrom and Weber (1982) in stand-
ard auctions with a¢ liated information. There, in a context of one-dimensional adverse
selection auction models, Milgrom and Weber show that under a¢ liation, it is optimal
for the seller to release as much information as she can to the bidders (see also Ottaviani
and Prat (2001) for a similar investigation in the monopoly problem).
In the context of moral hazard problems, the above question has received less attention.
Of course, the above question is related to the issue of optimal information disclosure as
studied in a Sender-Receiver setup by Rayo and Segal (2010) or to the issue of Bayesian
persuasion as studied (also in a Sender-Receiver setup) by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
Compared to Rayo and Segal, the question studied here is more limited (since there is
no characterization of the optimal information disclosure), but it is analyzed in a more
general setup (since the setup considered here covers cases with multiple agents, monetary
instruments and any functional form of preferences as well as distributions of the state
￿). Compared to Kamenica and Gentzkow, it should be noted that they focus on when it
is best for the Sender to disclose some information as opposed to none, which lies at the
other extreme of the information disclosure question (as compared with the transparency
13question).
Note that when addressing the above question, I simply perform comparative statics
varying the information structure of agent 1 (as all the papers just cited do). That is, I
do not discuss the issue of how the information disclosure policy chosen by the designer
would be interpreted by the agents so as to re￿ne their estimate of ￿. Such a view seems
appropriate to deal with organizations in which there is enough time to commit in advance
(before the realization of ￿ is known) to whatever disclosure policy sounds best. I also
allow myself to choose the information structure the designer likes best. It may be argued
that in some applications, some aspects of ￿ cannot be hidden to the agent in which case
the transparency question should be rephrased to allow only for admissible coarsening of
agent 1￿ s information. For the purpose of the main result below, ￿ should be interpreted
to stand for the characteristics of the problem that can potentially be hidden to agent 1.
It should be mentioned that the above abstract question can be related to the more
concrete question as to whether it is good to disclose the individual contracts governing the
various agents￿incentives to their team partners. Indeed, not disclosing these contracts
may be a way not to fully reveal ￿ and also a way to hide some aspects of what shapes
the team members￿working incentives. Besides, to the extent that the agent￿ s payo⁄does
depend on ￿, the desirability of not disclosing ￿ can be related to the possible advantage
of using stochastic contracts rather than deterministic ones.
4.1 Full information benchmark
In the benchmark scenario, agents 1 and 2 know ￿ (and in equilibrium they know each
other￿ s strategy). That is, given the instruments w, agents 1 and 2 play a Nash equilibrium
of the complete information game de￿ned by the payo⁄ ui(a1;a2;w;￿) received by agent
i for every action pro￿le a = (a1;a2) and the instrument(s) w.
In order to avoid technical complications, I will assume that ui is a concave function of
a that varies smoothly with w and ￿. Moreover, I will assume that whatever aj,w;￿, the
function ai ! ui(a1;a2;w;￿) is always maximized in a bounded subset of Ai (whatever
w, ￿).
Such assumptions guarantee that 1) an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists,
and that 2) for almost all (w;￿), Nash equilibria are locally unique and vary smoothly
14with (w;￿) (see MasColell et al. (1995)).
I will denote by aNE
i (w;￿) one such equilibrium and I will assume it is the one describ-
ing the interaction in our team problem. Thus, in the benchmark scenario, in problem ￿,






I will be interested in situations in which the solution obtained is di⁄erent from the
￿rst-best solution the designer would choose if she could herself decide on a1, a2 as well
as w. This is typically the case in moral hazard problems with one or two agents if
transfers must be bounded and/or if agents are risk averse (unless agents￿preferences
are perfectly aligned with those of the designer and/or the designer can observe agents￿
actions and these are veri￿able). Observe that in such cases, it is typically the case
that 5a1￿(aNE
1 (w;￿);aNE
2 (w;￿);w;￿) 6= 0. That is, even adjusting the instruments w
optimally, the marginal e⁄ect of a1 in the various directions need not be 0.
4.2 The coarse information case
To address the transparency question, I will consider situations in which agent 1 does not
know whether ￿ = ￿x or ￿y while the designer and agent 2 do.13 In this case, the relevant
solution concept is the Bayes Nash equilibrium. The above concavity and smoothness
assumptions guarantee that 1) there exists an interior pure strategy equilibrium and that
2) Bayes Nash equilibria (which are locally unique) inherit the smoothness properties of
ui for almost all w and ￿x or ￿y.
For each wx, wy, a Bayes Nash equilibrium is such that player 1 chooses action aCI
1 in
both ￿x;￿y and player 2 chooses actions aCI
2;x and aCI
























13For the main result below, it is enough to consider information sets consisting of two states.
15Letting aCI(w) denote the Bayes Nash equilibrium prevailing in the team problem,










In the analysis, I will assume that if aNE
1 (wx;￿x) = aNE
1 (wy;￿y) in the full information
benchmark, then in the game in which agent 1 does not know whether ￿x or ￿y, the play
is described by the complete information equilibrium strategy pro￿le, as well. Clearly,
such a strategy pro￿le is a Bayes Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information game,
and the assumption just made ensures that the comparison between the two informational
scenarios is meaningful.14































for all (wx;wy). In such a case, when agent 1 does not know ￿ = ￿x, ￿y while agent 2
does and the available instruments w are set optimally, one can be sure that it delivers a
strictly larger payo⁄ to the organization than the one prevailing when both agents know
￿.
5 Main Result
The main result of this paper is that when the dimensionality s of ￿ is su¢ ciently large,
it is (generically) strictly desirable that at least one agent be coarsely informed of ￿.
To present this result formally, I de￿ne the notion of genericity employed here. Let
14Alternatively, stronger conditions on ui and uj could be imposed that guarantee the uniqueness of
the equilibrium.
16X = Rn1 ￿ Rn2 ￿ R!1+!2 ￿ Rs denote the domain of the pro￿t functions ￿. Consider
functions ￿ 2 C2(X). The set ￿ of C2(X) pro￿t functions is endowed with a Whitney
C2 topology by letting a sequence ￿n 2 ￿ converge to ￿ if and only if ￿n ￿ ￿ as well as
the Jacobian of ￿n ￿ ￿ and the matrix of second derivative of ￿n ￿ ￿ converge uniformly
to zero in the space of continuous functions over the relevant range of ai, w, ￿ (assumed
to be bounded, see above). The de￿nition of genericity is:
De￿nition. A set ￿ ￿ ￿ is generic in ￿ if it contains a set that is open and dense in
￿.
The main result is:
Theorem 1 Suppose the dimensionality of ￿ is strictly bigger than the dimensionality
of a1, that is, s > n1. Then for generic functions ￿, some non-full disclosure of ￿ to
agent 1 strictly enhances the designer￿ s objective as compared with the full information
benchmark.
It should be mentioned that if one were to restrict attention to well-behaved pro￿t
functions ￿ varying over countably many dimensions, say polynomials of any degree,
then the conclusion of Theorem 1 would hold for a measure 1 set of ￿ functions, thereby
o⁄ering a measure-theoretic counterpart to this theorem. Besides, it should be highlighted
that the conditions of Theorem 1 should be expected to be satis￿ed in most real life
settings. Indeed, the parameter ￿ characterizing the team problem should be thought
of as containing at least information on the structure of the marginal cost incurred by
each agent i along the various dimensions of his e⁄ort ai (this has dimension no less than
ni), together with say information on the e⁄ect of the action pro￿les on the designer￿ s
objective, thereby making the dimension of the team problem s typically strictly larger
than n1 + n2 ￿ max(n1;n2). It should also be mentioned that whenever some aspects of
￿ cannot be hidden to the agent (say because he knows it anyway - this could be relevant
for the agent￿ s own cost structure, for example), Theorem 1 still applies, as long as the
dimension of the part of ￿ that can be hidden to the agent exceeds the dimension of this
agent￿ s action space, which again sounds like the natural case in most applications of
17interest (since it seems possible to hide the cost structure of the other agent).15;16
5.1 The main arguments
Theorem 1 will ￿rst be established in the special case in which the principal has no
instrument w, there is a single agent who has to choose a one-dimensional action, and the
problem varies along two dimensions. It will then be explained how to extend the result
to general multi-agent settings with arbitrary instruments for the designer and arbitrary
dimensions n1, n2 whenever s > n1.
Consider a setting with one agent whose action is a 2 R, and ￿ 2 R2 parameterizes
the agent￿ s payo⁄ function u(a;￿). The complete information solution a(￿) satis￿es:
@
@au(a;￿) = 0.17
Consider ￿0 in the interior of the ￿-space, and let
A(￿0) = f￿ such that a(￿) = a(￿0)g:
For smooth u and generic ￿0, this is a smooth (i.e. locally di⁄erentiable) manifold of
dimension 1, which (locally around ￿0) lies in the interior of the ￿-space.18 Let ￿1 2 A(￿0),
￿1 6= ￿0 be in the interior of the ￿-space.
Starting from ￿1, consider a direction ￿ in the ￿ space in which ￿1+"￿ is not in A(￿0)
for " small enough and such that @2u
@a@￿￿(a(￿0);￿1) 6= 0. (Such a direction exists for generic
15For example, considering the moral hazard in team problem described in sections 2.2 and 3 (possibly
in a multi-task version as in 2.1), the conclusion of Theorem 1 holds to the extent that the cost structure
of agent j, gj(￿), together with the complementarity parameter ￿ and the organizational reward R can
be hidden to agent i and that the dimension of e⁄ort ai is less than the dimension over which gj, ￿ and
R can vary.
16Even in one-agent problems, playing on the possible monitoring technologies of the Principal would
typically allow enough ￿ exibility to get the conclusion of Theorem 1.
17Observe that what I am assuming here is only that (at least over a range of ￿) the solution a(￿)
varies smoothly with ￿ and is locally pinned down by the ￿rst-order conditions (i.e., no other a in the
neighborhood of a(￿) satis￿es the ￿rst-order condition). Thus, I am not following here the methodology
of the ￿rst-order approach, as I am not maximizing the principal￿ s objective assuming only that the
￿rst-order conditions for the agent are satis￿ed (see Hart and Holmstr￿m (1983) for some considerations
on the ￿rst-order approach).
18The observation that A(￿0) is a manifold of strictly positive dimension is key for the argument below






















u. For example, such a direction may be one in which the marginal e⁄ect of a on u is
modi￿ed in proportion to a.)
Consider the problems ￿ = ￿0 and ￿1 + "￿ for " either positive or negative but small
(remember ￿1 lies in the interior of the ￿-space). The idea is to compare the aggregate
expected objective ￿ when the agent knows whether ￿ = ￿0 or ￿1 + "￿ and the expected
objective when the agent ignores whether ￿ = ￿0 or ￿1 + "￿. The various ￿ considered
here are illustrated in Figure 1.
Clearly for " = 0, the two cases generate the same aggregate ￿ by de￿nition of A(￿0).19
But, for " 6= 0, the two solutions will not in general lead to the same aggregate e⁄ect on
￿. I will now compute the ￿rst order e⁄ect in " of this di⁄erence and show that it is
generically di⁄erent from 0, thereby allowing me to conclude that a coarse information
of the above type either for " > 0 and small or " < 0 and small dominates the complete
information case.
19In the general multi-agent extension, the selection hypothesis for Nash Bayes equilibria of games of
incomplete information is being used as well.
19Let a0 = a(￿0) and a1(") = a(￿1 + "￿). They satisfy
@
@a
u(a0;￿0) = 0 (1)
@
@a
u(a1(");￿1 + "￿) = 0










CI(");￿1 + "￿) = 0: (2)
I wish to sign ￿(") de￿ned as
p(￿0)[￿(a0;￿0) ￿ ￿(a
CI(");￿0)] + p(￿1 + "￿)[￿(a1(");￿1 + "￿) ￿ ￿(a
CI(");￿1 + "￿)]:
Clearly, if ￿(") < 0, it is strictly better that the agent does not know whether ￿ = ￿0 or
￿1 + "￿.











where o(") denotes a function such that
o(")
" goes to 0 as " goes to 0.
Moreover from (1) and (2) (and using that @2u
@a2 < 0 is di⁄erent from 0), we have that:














where @h=@￿￿ denotes the derivative of h in the direction ￿￿ and all functions are
taken at a = a0.
After multiplying ￿(") by @2u
@a2(￿1)[p(￿0)@2u
@a2(￿0)+p(￿1)@2u
@a2(￿1)] and dividing by p(￿0)p(￿1)

























@a@￿￿(￿1) < 0. Then taking " > 0 and su¢ ciently
small, we can infer from the above that not letting the agent know whether ￿ = ￿0 or










@a@￿￿(￿1) > 0, then taking " < 0 and
su¢ ciently small, not letting the agent know whether ￿ = ￿0 or ￿1+"￿ strictly dominates
the complete information benchmark (remember than since ￿1 is in the interior of the
￿-space, one can move in any direction from ￿1).

























@a2(￿0) = 0 (3)
But, this condition is not satis￿ed for generic ￿ functions.
To see this more formally, consider the family of ￿￿ functions
￿￿(a;￿) = ￿(a;￿) + ￿a k ￿ ￿ ￿0 k
2
where ￿ 2 R and k ￿￿￿0 k denotes the euclidean distance between ￿ and ￿0. Obviously,
if ￿ satis￿es (3), then for ￿ 6= 0, ￿￿ does not satisfy (3) -observe that changing ￿ does
not a⁄ect the expressions of a1("), aCI(")- from which one can conclude that the set of
￿ for which (3) does not hold is dense. Moreover, this set is also clearly open given the




@a2(￿0) according to the Whitney
C2 topology.20
20Clearly, if one were to consider polynomial functions ￿, then (3) would not hold for a measure 1 set
of parameter values.
21I now sketch how the argument extends to the general case considered in Theorem 1.
1) Adding instruments w.
Suppose the designer can now (optimally) choose instrument(s) w still assuming that
there is a single agent. To ￿x ideas, take the above setting and assume that the designer





Thus, keeping ￿ constant on has: @u
@a(a;w;￿) = 0, which after complete di⁄erentiation





















De￿ne ￿(a;￿) = ￿(a;w(￿);￿) and apply the argument developed above when there
were no instruments assuming ￿ is the designer￿ s objective. Clearly, if not letting the agent
know whether ￿ = ￿0 or ￿1 +"￿ strictly dominates the complete information benchmark
for this case, then in the case when the designer can choose w, it also strictly dominates
(because the designer always has the option to set w to be w(￿) in problem ￿).










@a2(￿0) = 0 (4)
To see this, consider the family of ￿￿ functions




where ￿ 2 R. For such a family, w(￿) are the same at ￿ = ￿0 (resp. ￿1) whatever ￿ so
that
@￿￿
@a (￿) = @￿
@a + ￿ k ￿ ￿ ￿0 k2 for ￿ = ￿0 and ￿1. Thus, if ￿ satis￿es (4), ￿￿ does not
for any ￿ 6= 0, and one can conclude as before.
222) Having more than one player.
Roughly, this consists in extending the above di⁄erential arguments that were de-
rived from one agent optimization conditions to a system of simultaneous optimization
conditions as derived from the Nash equilibrium conditions.







which de￿nes implicitly a1(￿) and a2(￿). Given that ￿ has higher dimension than a1 one
can de￿ne (for generic u1 and u2) a manifold of dimension s￿n1 ￿ 1 in the ￿ space such
that a1(￿) = a1(￿0), i.e. A(￿0) = f￿ s.t. a1(￿) = a1(￿0)g.
Consider ￿1 2 A(￿0) and a direction ￿ in the ￿ space so that ￿1 + "￿ is known not to
























2;1(");￿1 + "￿) = 0
And if there is full information, NE actions a1;0, a1;1, a2;0 and a2;1 are given by:
8
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@a1(a1;1(");a2;1(");￿1 + "￿) = 0










2;1(");￿1 + "￿)] ￿ ￿(a1;1(");a2;1(");￿1 + "￿)]
Similarly to the one agent case if ￿0(0) 6= 0, then it implies that not letting agent 1
know whether ￿0 or ￿1 + "￿ with " > 0 or " < 0 but small strictly improves over the
full information benchmark and ￿0(0) = 0 can be shown to be non-generic by considering
perturbations of the form ￿￿(a1;a2;￿) = ￿(a1;a2;￿) + ￿a1 k ￿ ￿ ￿0 k2.
5.2 Discussion
1) The logic of the argument used in subsection 2.1 does not quite follow the method
of proof considered above when allowing for monetary instruments in Principal-agent in-
teractions. Indeed, the method of proof consisted in freezing the monetary instruments
at the full information optimal ones, and reason as in the case with no monetary instru-
ments. By contrast, in Subsection 2.1, the monetary instruments were changed relative
to the (optimal) full information ones, and this change together with the coarsening of
information induced the strict improvement.21
Yet, the argument used in subsection 2.1 would work more generally. To illustrate this,
consider the case in which the action space as well as the space of monetary instruments
w are one-dimensional, while the space of ￿ is of dimension 2. Consider ￿1 2 A(￿0),
￿1 6= ￿0 as in subsection 2.1 with w0 and w1 being the optimal (full information) values
of w when ￿ = ￿0 or ￿ = ￿1, respectively.
The idea is to bundle ￿0 and ￿1 into one information set while allowing to move w
away from the full information levels. Speci￿cally, consider w0
1 = w1+" where " is assumed
to be small (but may be either positive or negative) and keep w0 unchanged. It turns out
that for generic functions ￿, such a coarse information with a small " (either positive or
21More precisely, in that problem one took ￿y 2 A(￿x) and one showed that by assigning ￿x and ￿y
to the same information set and making some changes of the monetary instruments w one could generate
strictly larger expected pro￿t for the organization as compared with the full information benchmark
(whereas the above argument required putting ￿x and some ￿0
y in the neighborhood of ￿y in the same
information set and proceed with the full information optimal values of w.
24negative) is strictly bene￿cial to the organization as compared with the full information
benchmark.
In the coarse information case, the agent solves:
max
a p(￿0)u(a;w0;￿0) + p(￿1)u(a;w1 + ";￿1) (5)
Let a(") denote the action chosen by the agent and let
e ￿(") = p(￿0)￿(a(");w0;￿0) + p(￿1)￿(a(");w1 + ";￿1)
denote the corresponding expected organization payo⁄. What we wish to show is that
for generic values de ￿
d"(" = 0) is not 0, thereby ensuring that there exists a small " (either
positive or negative) so that e ￿(") > e ￿(0) where e ￿(0) is also the full information expected
organizational payo⁄.
To show that de ￿







(a;w1 + ";￿1) = 0:












which in turn yields that @e ￿









































25It is now not di¢ cult to see that generically it cannot be that the expression in (6) is
null.22
2) The above argument for Theorem 1 shows that one can gain by not letting agent 1
know whether ￿ = ￿0 or ￿1(￿0) (￿1(￿0) = ￿1+"￿ in the above notation). By considering
a positive mass neighborhood of N(￿0) and the corresponding ￿1(￿) for ￿ 2 N(￿0), one
can in fact show that the gains of not letting agent 1 know whether ￿ 2 N(￿0) or ￿1(￿)
are strictly positive in expected terms. Building on the example of subsection 2.1, it is
not hard to verify that the gains of non-transparency can be made arbitrarily large (in
relative terms), since in that example the complete information benchmark resulted in 0
aggregate pro￿t whereas strictly positive pro￿t could be achieved with coarse information.
3) Getting back to the trade-o⁄ (resulting from coarsening the information partition)
between relaxing the incentive constraints (through aggregation) and constraining the
strategy (through measurability constraints), Theorem 1 shows that one can always ￿nd an
information partition such that the former e⁄ect dominates the latter. Yet, the argument
used to prove this is not to show that the latter e⁄ect can be made of second order as
compared with the former e⁄ect. In the construction, when agent 1 does not know whether
￿ = ￿0 or ￿1 + "￿, both e⁄ects are of the same order. The result follows because, it is
generically the case that for either " > 0 or " < 0 but small the former e⁄ect dominates
the latter e⁄ect.
4) In the above analysis, I have implicitly ignored agents￿participation constraints.
Consider now imposing that agents should get at least their outside option payo⁄. Clearly,
nothing changes if the participation constraints are not binding.23 For example, in con-
texts with limited liability, agents typically receive a positive rent in moral hazard prob-
lems and the participation constraints are not binding. In the absence of limited liability
constraints though, the designer would typically adjust the instruments w so that agents
get their outside option payo⁄in pure moral hazard problems (see Holmstr￿m (1979-1982)
22Consider families of ￿ such that @￿
@a(a;wk;￿k)= @￿
@w(a;wk;￿k) remains constant for k = 0;1 but
@￿
@a(a;w0;￿0)=@￿
@a(a;w1;￿1) varies. The full information conditions remain unchanged while the expression
of @e ￿
@" varies (unless @
2u
@a@w = 0, which for generic functions u would not hold).
23If the participation constraints are binding both at ￿ = ￿0 and ￿1+"￿ in the main argument used to
prove Theorem 1 when w is set at w(￿) in problem ￿, one has to worry that the agent gets no less than
his outside option payo⁄ when the agent does not know whether ￿ = ￿0 or ￿1 + "￿, which may require
increasing the burden to the designer.
26or Holmstr￿m-Milgrom (1991) in the context of risk-averse agents without limited liability
constraints). It should be noted however that if in addition to the moral hazard problem,
agents were assumed to possess some private information then most "types" of agents
would receive positive rent even in the absence of limited liability constraints. Theorem
1 could then be applied to such settings.
5) In the above framework, I have not allowed for mechanisms in which a mediator
could make recommendations to agents as to which actions to choose. If such mechanisms
are allowed, one can always implement the optimal mechanism by having agents be only
informed of what to do (action ai for agent i) (see Myerson, 1982). From that perspective,
what Theorem 1 shows is the stronger property that when the dimension of ￿ is larger
than the dimension of agents￿actions it cannot be optimal to let the agents know ￿.
6) In the context of Theorem 1, only the information structure of agent 1 was varied
(as agent 2 was assumed to have complete information). If one further imposes that the
information (about ￿) should be public among agents 1 and 2, then the same kind of
non-transparency result as in Theorem 1 prevails, as long as the dimensionality of ￿ is
bigger than the sum of the dimensions of both agents￿actions, i.e. s > n1 +n2. The idea
is now to work with the manifold
B(￿0) = f￿ s.t. a1(￿) = a1(￿0) and a2(￿) = a2(￿0)g
which for generic ￿0 has dimension s ￿ (n1 + n2).
6 Disclosure policy in low dimensional cases
In this Section, I consider settings in which the dimension of the state space is the same
as the dimension of agents￿action spaces, and I observe in representative classes of applic-
ations that full transparency is often the best disclosure policy in contrast to the message
of Theorem 1 above.
6.1 Delegation with heterogeneous congruence
Consider the authority model of Aghion and Tirole (1997):
27u1(a1;a2;￿) = a2￿b + (1 ￿ a2)a1b ￿ g1(a1)
u2(a1;a2;￿) = a2B + (1 ￿ a2)a1￿b ￿ g2(a2)
And assume that the sole source of heterogeneity is the parameter ￿ of congruence. I also
let b = B; ￿ = 1 and g1(a) = g2(a) = a2
2 .
I show that no matter what ￿1 < ￿2 < ::: < ￿n are, the principal (agent 2) is better
o⁄ when the agent (agent 1) knows which ￿ is prevailing rather than when he does not




















2 (￿i) = B[1 ￿ ￿i
B(1 ￿ B)
1 ￿ E(￿)B2]
where E(￿) is the expected value of ￿.
Given the convexity of ￿ !
B(1￿B)
1￿￿B2 , it is readily veri￿ed that E(aNE
1 (￿)) > aNE
1 (E(￿)) =
aCI
1 . Furthermore, as common sense suggests, agent 2￿ s e⁄ort decreases with the de-
gree of congruence in the coarse information case aCI
2 (￿1) > aCI
2 (￿2):::: > aCI
2 (￿n), and
agent 1￿ s e⁄ort increases with the degree of congruence ￿ in the full information case
aNE
2 (￿1) < aNE
2 (￿2):::: < aNE
2 (￿n):
The di⁄erence of agent 2￿ s expected payo⁄ in the coarse information case and the





[Ba2 + B(1 ￿ a2)￿ia
NE





[Ba2 + B(1 ￿ a2)￿ia
CI
1 ￿ g2(a2)]
It is no smaller than
P
i p(￿i)B(1 ￿ aCI
2 (￿i))￿i(aNE
1 (￿i) ￿ aCI
1 ) (because in the max
appearing in the ￿rst summation on can always pick a2 = aCI
2 (￿i) when ￿ = ￿i, i.e. the








1 (￿i) ￿ E(a
NE
1 (￿))
which is strictly positive given that ￿ ! (1￿aCI
2 (￿))￿ and ￿ ! aNE
1 (￿) are both increasing
with ￿.
To summarize,
Proposition 1 In the optimal delegation problem with quadratic cost of e⁄ort, when the
sole heterogeneity is on the congruence parameter ￿, full disclosure of ￿ is always the best
policy for the principal.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Not letting the agent know ￿ leads him to
pick his e⁄ort level as a best-response to a mixed distribution of Principal￿ s e⁄ort. This
in turn leads the agent to make less e⁄ort than in the complete information case when the
congruence parameter ￿ is bigger and more e⁄ort when it is smaller. But, the Principal
would prefer the bias to be the other way round given the implication of the congruence
parameter, thereby explaining why full information disclosure is preferable in this case.
Several remarks are in order regarding this proposition. First, even though Proposition
1 was established for the case in which the organizational objective coincides with agent
2￿ s payo⁄, it should be clear that the same conclusion continues to hold for organizational
objective functions that would lie in a neighborhood of agent 2￿ s objective function, thus
the conclusion holds generically. Second, the result of Proposition 1 is not in contradiction
with Theorem 1 above because the setup analyzed here is one in which the dimensionality
of ￿ is the same as the dimensionality of the e⁄ort of the agent (so that there is no
29manifold of strictly positive dimension in the ￿ space in which at the Nash equilibrium,
the agent performs the same e⁄ort level).24
6.2 Moral hazard in team with heterogeneous complementarity
Consider the following moral hazard in team problem in which agent i = 1;2￿ s payo⁄ is
ui(a1;a2;￿) = (a1 + a2 + ￿a1a2)w ￿
(ai)2
2
and the corresponding pro￿t is
￿(a1;a2;￿) = (a1 + a2 + ￿a1a2)(R ￿ 2w):





I simplify the analysis by assuming that the bonus w is not an instrument of the designer,
and that it is set independently of ￿ and satis￿es w < R=2.25




n and let pk denote the probability of ￿
k. Consider both the case of
complete information and the case of coarse information in which no agent i = 1 or 2
knows whether ￿ is ￿
1;:::or ￿
n.
Proposition 2 The coarse information disclosure policy always generates strictly less
expected pro￿t to the designer than the complete information disclosure policy.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Not letting the agents know which ￿ prevails
leads agents to make comparatively more e⁄ort when the complementarity parameter
is low and less e⁄ort when it is large. This is bad for the overall pro￿t because the
marginal e⁄ect of e⁄ort is larger when the complementarity parameter is larger, thereby
explaining why the complete information disclosure policy dominates in this case. The
detailed proof of Proposition 2 appears in Appendix. Observe again that this result is
24Reproducing the argument for Theorem 1 with ￿1 = ￿0 would yield that ￿(") is of the same order
as "2, and thus one would not be able to conclude from the argument given there.
25Such an assumption would ￿t if we have in mind that the bonus w is negotiated after a success is
being obtained and the two agents have the same bargaining power (independent of ￿).
30not in contradiction with the insight of our main result (Theorem 1) given that here the
dimensionality of the problem is equal to the dimensionality of the e⁄ort level.
6.3 Sender-Receiver interaction with uniform bias
Consider the Sender-Receiver (Crawford-Sobel, 1982) model with quadratic utility func-
tions. That is, the state ! varies in [0;1] according to some smooth distribution with
density f(:). The receiver chooses an action a in [0;1]. The receiver and sender￿ s payo⁄s
depend on a and ! according to
uR(a;!) = ￿(a ￿ !)
2
uS(a;!) = ￿(a ￿ ! ￿ b)
2
The quadratic payo⁄ of the receiver implies that the receiver chooses an action equal to
the expected value of ! (given his information). The Sender on the other hand would like
the action to be biased toward higher (resp lower) values whenever b > 0 (resp b < 0).
Given the strict concavity of the function x ! ￿(x ￿ b)2, Jensen￿ s inequality implies
that whatever the non-degenerate distribution of !,
￿E[E(w) ￿ w ￿ b]
2 < ￿b
2 (7)
(since E[E(w) ￿ w] = 0). Given that the left-handside is what the Sender would get
in expectation in a coarse disclosure case and the right-handside is what she gets in the
complete information case, (7) implies that:
Proposition 3 In the Sender-Receiver interaction with quadratic utility functions, full
transparency is always best.
Again, the above result does not contradict our main result, since the setup considered
in the above proposition is one in which the dimension of the state ! coincides with the
dimension of the Receiver￿ s action. As already mentioned in Introduction, Rayo and Segal
(2010) consider a case in which the information held by the Sender is two-dimensional
and they observe in their setup that full disclosure is never best in accordance with the
main result of this paper.
317 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that some form of non-transparency is desirable, as long as
the dimensionality of what can be hidden exceeds the dimensionality of agents￿action
spaces. It is tempting to relate the theoretical result obtained in this paper to the wide-
spread practice in organizations not to inform workers of other workers￿wages and bonus
schemes. More work though should be devoted to analyze in more details the pros and
the cons of such practices. More generally, it would be desirable to make progress on
which characteristics of the problem ￿ should be kept secret and which ones should be
made publicly available to agents.
32Appendix (Proof of Proposition 2)
Routine calculations yield that in the full information case agents choose aNE(￿) =
w






where E(￿) denotes the expected value of ￿. Given the convexity of ￿ ! w
1￿￿w, it follows




The di⁄erence of expected pro￿t in the complete disclosure case and in the coarse inform-
ation case writes:

































i) ￿ aCI) > 0 by (8).
Moreover, let i￿ = argmini
￿
i such that aNE(￿
i) ￿ aCI￿
. Given the monotonicity
of i ! aNE(￿
i), we have that for i ￿ i￿, aNE(￿
i) ￿ aCI and for i < i￿, aNE(￿
i) ￿
aCI. Writing (aNE(￿
i))2 ￿ (aCI)2 as (aNE(￿
i) + aCI))(aNE(￿
i) ￿ aCI), making use of the




, and of the change of sign of aNE(￿
i) ￿ aCI at














































which again is strictly positive by (8). Q. E. D.
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